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We analyze the relation between corruption, competition and inequality in a
developing economy context where markets are imperfect and there is wealth
inequality. We consider an economy where different types of households
(efficient and inefficient) choose whether to enter the production sector or not.
Due to information asymmetry and wealth inequality, the market fails to screen
out the inefficient types. In addition to the imperfect screening in the credit
market, the inefficient type’s entry is further facilitated by corruption in the product
market. We analyze the market equilibrium and look at some of the implications.
We show that a rise in inequality can lead to an increase in corruption along with
greater competition. By endogenising the types, we also show how in the
presence of corruption, initial wealth inequality will distort the incentives of the
poor and lead to trap-like situations.
Keywords:  Corruption, Competition, Credit Market, Inequality, Screening.
JEL Classification: D60, I20, R20.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Jens Andvig, Kaushik Basu, Monojit Chatterji, Maitreesh Ghatak, Ashok
Parikh, Gurleen Popli and seminar participants at CMI, Bergen and UEA for comments and
discussions. Part of the research was done while the second author was visiting Delhi School of
Economics and Cornell University. Support from these institutions is gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
Corruption has received a lot of attention from various quarters- especially in
the context of developing economies1. Anti-corruption strategies have gener-
ally been based on the perception, both in academic and policy circles, that
market forces through greater competition will lead to low levels of corrup-
tion (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Ades and di Tella, 1999; World Bank, 1997)2.
Therefore it was expected that deregulation, liberalization and large scale
entry of private ﬁrms3 will deter corruption. The experience of the tran-
sition countries and other developing countries, however, show that despite
embracing considerable deregulation and liberalization over the last decade,
corruption is on the rise (Leiken 1996-97, Kaufman and Siegelbaum 1997).
In this paper we provide a new explanation to this apparent contradiction.
We develop a rationale for why corruption and competition may coexist from
a multi-market perspective. In doing so we explicitly bring in the role of
wealth inequality in fostering corruption, which so far has not been examined
fully in the literature.
Previous attempts in providing an explanation to this contradiction has
mainly focussed on the implementation of the reforms and the role of the
institutions(Kaufman 1997, Shleifer 1997, Levin and Satarov 2000)4. The
1The World Bank (2003) puts corruption as the ‘single biggest obstacle to economic and social develop-
ment’.
2Recently, however, this view has come under further scrutiny (Laﬀont and N’Guessan, 1999).
3In many transition countries the growth in the number of small private ﬁrms is quite noticeable.
4For a discussion of the existence of corruption and competition in diﬀerent contexts please refer to
Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
1main argument, broadly speaking, was that because of institutional features
true deregulation and liberalization had not taken place in many of these
countries. Therefore we may see an increase in corruption even if there
is more competition through privatization. Two countries are particularly
picked up to make this point. It is shown that in Poland, where substantial
deregulation has taken place, one can ﬁnd more competition and hence less
corruption; the Russian privatization has on the other hand spurred more
regulatory bodies, stiﬂed proper competition and increased corruption (Frye
and Shleifer 1997). While this is no doubt a plausible explanation, the
underlying thrust of the argument remains that ‘proper’ deregulation and
privatization will reduce corruption. Our model on the other hand show
that in the presence of standard market imperfections (such as informational
problems) and wealth inequality we may ﬁnd that increased number of ﬁrms
and corruption may coexist. The east and south east Asian experience show
that it is indeed possible to have a more competitive economy with high
growth rate and still have increasing corruption 5.
In this context it is important to bear the nature of corruption in mind.
Most of the literature adopt what we call a ‘victimization’ approach- agents
pay bribes because of extortionary demand by the public oﬃcials6. Bribe
paying agents are not viewed as the real beneﬁciaries. We don’t deny this
but we argue that the extortion view does not explain the whole picture.
According to Hellman, Jones and Kaufman (2000) one of the main aspects
5Quite a few of the east and south east asian economies score below 5 in the Transparency International
(2003) perception index out of a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 indicating lowest corruption.
6Most of the leading models i.e. Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bliss and di Tella (1996) and the recent
ﬁrm level studies discussed later, follow the extortion view. This is not true for the agency based models of
corruption-i.e. Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), Laﬀont and N’Guessan(1999).
2of corruption in transition countries is the “phenomenon of ‘state capture’
by the corporate sector”. What it shows is that corruption also involves
collusion between the government and private agents although agents may
diﬀer in terms of their beneﬁts from corruption. This feature of corruption
is key to the present paper.
It is quite clear from the extortion view of corruption that as extortion
payments increase, proﬁtability decreases and fewer ﬁrms stay in the market7.
The causation can run in the reverse also. Fewer ﬁrms would mean higher
proﬁt (monopoly rent) and this leads to greater possibility of bribe extraction
and more corruption. Firms with monopoly rents have the incentive to
bribe oﬃcials to retain their monopoly proﬁt. So in this case, corruption
would imply that potential competitors are denied entry into the market,
hence corruption helps reduce competition. On the other hand, if we take
the collusion view and consider markets where eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms
can coexist, the opposite results may follow. It is possible that these highly
ineﬃcient ﬁrms thrive because of corruption and corruption allows the entry
of these ﬁrms.
However, corruption alone may not be suﬃcient. Other forms of imper-
fections are also necessary for the presence of these ﬁrms. If these ﬁrms
are ineﬃcient (high risk and low return), how do they exist in the market?
Won’t market forces drive them out? Possibly yes, but as we show informa-
tional problems and wealth constraints in the credit market may contribute
7Bliss and diTella (1997) ﬁrst addressed the relation between corruption and competititon. The same
issue has been developed from diﬀerent perspectives in Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999), Ades and diTella
(1999). This howerver is not related to other notion of competititon among public oﬃcials which might
reduce corruption. Some would argue (see Rose-Ackerman (1996)) that any kind of competition would
reduce corruption.
3to these ineﬃcient ﬁrms’ existence. Hence, in some sense, corruption surfaces
in the product market because of inequality and informational problems in
the credit market. More speciﬁcally, we analyze how the credit market is
not able to screen out ineﬃcient ﬁrms. The screening mechanism breaks
down because some households are wealth constrained. Since the ineﬃcient
type ﬁrms engage in corruption, it aﬀects not just their payoﬀs but also the
payoﬀs of the eﬃcient ﬁrms and determines the overall market outcome. The
ineﬃcient ﬁrms tend to get subsidized in the credit market and beneﬁt from
corruption- thus making their operation viable and possibly proﬁtable.
Although corruption manifests itself in many ways, here we only consider
the problem of ﬁrms engaging in various acts of bribery to avoid legal costs of
doing their business. These costs could include taxes, hiding of output, failure
to meet standards and controls. In our framework, ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of
their beneﬁts from corruption and only the ineﬃcient (low proﬁtability) end
up paying bribes for various illegal activities8. It is not possible to verify this
empirically, as ﬁrms are unlikely to report these collusive payments. Some
of the recent exercises by Hellman et. al. (2000), Johnson et. al. (1999)
and Svensson (2003) use questionnaire based survey to analyze the nature
of bribe payments by ﬁrms. But all these reﬂect extortion payments rather
than the whole range of bribery.
Our paper diﬀers from other papers in the literature in three main aspects.
First, the paper uses a multi-market framework to explore the link between
corruption, competition and wealth inequality. In the literature9, corruption
8This is opposite to view that ﬁrms hide and engage in illegal activities because they are subject to
extortion, see Shleifer (1997). But as Johnson et.al. (1999) rightly point out, it is not possible to ascertain
whether ﬁrms pay bribes because they hide or they hide beasue they are subject to extortion.
9See Bardhan (1997), Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001) for recent surveys on corruption.
4is studied mainly in the context of problems in that particular market, be it
informational asymmetries or incentive structure. While we do not doubt the
merit of this, we feel that it is important to see if this problem is related to
imperfections in other related markets. Here, our focus is on the link between
corruption in the product market and wealth inequality and imperfections in
the credit market. We argue that they reinforce each other and it may not be
suﬃcient to look at corruption alone. The framework also allows us to ask how
corruption aﬀects the persistence of wealth inequality. Even though we don’t
have a dynamic framework, we can see how wealth inequality and corruption
distort the choice of projects by wealth constrained households. Second, the
collusion-view of corruption generates diﬀerent implications compared to the
extortion-view of corruption. We feel that both the features of corruption
are important in understanding corruption in most developing economies.
Third, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper to provide a
plausible explanation of how inequality may engender corruption. The few
papers (Gupta et. al 2002, Li et. al. 2003) which discuss inequality in the
context of corruption mainly look at how corruption leads to more inequality
empirically.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide some em-
pirical analysis to motivate our problem better and use the empirical results
to highlight the role of inequality in understanding the link between com-
petition and corruption. In the next section we provide a brief description
and intuition of the basic model. We then describe the characteristics of the
diﬀerent agents and how they interact strategically in our model. Section
4 contains the results and analysis under diﬀerent scenarios. We consider
5the complete information case and the incomplete information case with and
without wealth constraints arising from inequality. In section 5, we dis-
cuss various implications and extensions of our model. In our basic model
we assume that the distribution of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms are exogenously
given. Here we relax that assumption and see what happens to the link
between corruption competition and inequality when the types of ﬁrms are
endogenous. Further, we discuss implications for the persistence of inequal-
ity. Lastly, section 6 concludes with a few brief remarks and some directions
for future research.
2 Some empirical observations
In this section we present some simple empirical observations which illustrate
the link between corruption, competition and inequality. Our empirical anal-
ysis is based on the BEEPS survey by the World Bank (1999). For a set of
26 transition countries, the survey provides the percentage of ﬁrms engaged
in corruption10. The ﬁrms have been asked speciﬁc questions about the rea-
sons for engaging in corruption such as whether it was for tax purposes or
for the provision of public services etc. Keeping with our basic framework
(as explained in detail later), we have considered only those ﬁrms that have
indulged in corruption for tax purposes. The BEEPS survey made consistent
eﬀorts to select a representative sample of ﬁrms from each country (Hellman
et. al. 2000). We, therefore, take the number of ﬁrms surveyed in each of
these countries as an indicator for the total number of ﬁrms in each country.
10For our analysis we have used 23 countries. Three countries (Albania, Bosnia and Republic of Serpska)
have been dropped because recent gini indices for these countries were unavailable.
6Since data on wealth inequality are extremely rare, previous years gini in-
dex for income inequality have been used as proxy; the intuition being that
previous years income inequality will reﬂect on the current periods wealth
inequality through savings and investments. We have used the most recent
available gini index (of the past years) from the world development indicator
and the WIDER data set on inequality for these countries for 1999.
We use three separate logit models to test the link between corruption,
competition and inequality. Our dependent variable is the log of the ratio
of corrupt ﬁrms to non-corrupt ﬁrms. As is standard for logit models, we
name the ratio of corrupt ﬁrms to non-corrupt ﬁrms as the odds ratio. As
we will demonstrate later, increase in corruption in our model comes from
the increase in the number of corrupt ﬁrms in the economy relative to the
number of non-corrupt ﬁrms. Hence the odds ratio allows us to measure the
impact of a change in the exogenous variables on corruption. The ﬁrst two
speciﬁcations regresses the number of ﬁrms and the gini index separately on
the log of the odds ratio. The last speciﬁcation regress both inequality and
number of ﬁrms together on the log of the odds ratio. Table 1 summarizes
7Table 1: Regression on log of the odds ratio.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeﬃcients
Number of ﬁrms 0.000a -0.016*
(0.000)b (0.001)
Gini index 0.047** 0.052**
(0.013) (0.015)
Constant -0.524* -2.170** -2.113
(0.229) (0.460) (0.441)
R2 0.000c 0.325 0.356
F-statistics 0.04 12.40** 6.61**
Observations 23 23 23
The numbers in the brackets are the (robust) standard
errors. * Shows signiﬁcance at 10% level. ** Shows
signiﬁcance at 1% level. a: The actual value is 0.0001248.
b: The actual value is 0.000627. c: The actual value is 0.0002.
It is evident from Model 1 that the eﬀect of competition on corruption
is statistically insigniﬁcant. It validates the point that increase in number
of ﬁrms may not necessarily lead to a decrease in corruption. This does not
rule out, however, that for some countries competition may indeed decrease
corruption. On the other hand, there may be countries where competition
leads to increased corruption. We understand that the relationship between
competition and corruption is a complex one and our empirical model may
be too simplistic. One, however, can still use this observation to make the
8point that the link between competition and corruption is quite ambiguous.
The low R2 also prompts one to look for other variables that may explain
corruption better.
Therefore, next we look at inequality as a factor in explaining corruption
since it is an obvious variable of interest. Most empirical exercises in this
context have regressed corruption on inequality, thus examining the case
whether corruption worsens the income distribution (Gupta et. al. 2002, Li.
et al. 2001)11. Model 2 on the other hand tests for whether inequality leads
to an increase in corruption. Results from Table 1 indicate that it is indeed
the case that as inequality increases the number of corrupt ﬁrms relative to
non corrupt ﬁrms will increase. This aspect, where increased inequality leads
to more corruption, has not been analyzed rigorously before and it will be
one of our goals in this paper to provide an analytical explanation for the
observed link from inequality to corruption. Although informational problems
also play an important role in our analysis, as will be evident later, we have
not been able to take that explicitly in to account in our empirical exercise
due to lack of data. For most transition countries, however, in line with our
model, such market imperfections remain pervasive (Svenjar, 2002; Berglof
and Bolton, 2002).
Coming back to the link between competition and corruption, the most
striking result of the empirical analysis comes from Model 3. When we con-
trol for inequality the coeﬃcient for number of ﬁrms becomes negative. This
implies that given inequality, as competition increases, we will see a higher
proportion of non-corrupt ﬁrms entering the market thereby reducing cor-
11A paper by You and Khagram (2003), which has very recently come to our knowledge, empirically shows
that for a cross section of countries inequality leads to corruption.
9ruption. Therefore, it seems, implicit behind the assertion that competition
reduces corruption, is the assumption that inequality remains unchanged.
This paper on the other hand attempts to understand the link between com-
petition and corruption when there is a change in inequality.
3 The model
3.1 A Summary
We consider an economy with diﬀerent types of households12 (potential ﬁrms)
who may choose to undertake (entrepreneurial) production activities. Given
non-convexity in the production process the households choosing production
activity have go to the bank to borrow a certain amount say, K. Households
staying out of the production sector don’t need to borrow and they have
some ﬁxed outside income. Households are classiﬁed into basically two types:
good (with low risk and high output projects) and bad (with high risk and
low output projects). The latter type is assumed to be ineﬃcient in the sense
that its production plan fetches lower expected returns. Hence an optimal
mix would seek to maximize the proportion of good type. Production also
involves other costs like taxes, fees and costs of meeting standards and quality
control. We denote these as simply tax T. Inspectors are supposed to
ensure compliance by the ﬁrms, but they can collude with the ﬁrm and avoid
reporting.
The focus is on two levels of interactions. One takes place in the credit
market between the ﬁrm and the bank, and the other takes place in the
12We shall be using both terms ‘households’ and ‘ﬁrm’. Households in the production sector will be referred
to as ﬁrms.
10product market between the ﬁrm and the inspector. A particular household’s
expected payoﬀ from undertaking production depends on its type and the
outcome of these two interactions. The ﬁrst interaction referred to as the
credit game determines the cost of capital and the second determines the
eﬀective tax payment. As in the previous empirical section, the number of
ﬁrms engaging in bribery relative to the total number of ﬁrms in the market
will be taken as the level of corruption.
Corruption facilitates the entry of the ineﬃcient ﬁrms by raising the ex-
pected payoﬀ. Households can calculate their expected payoﬀ after taking
into account the fact that they can bribe the inspector and save on their tax
payment13. Hence some households who would not have entered the produc-
tion sector in the absence of corruption would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do so in the
presence of corruption. The extent of corruption, however, depends on the
outcome in the credit market. If the diﬀerent types are completely screened
in the credit market then it is diﬃcult to sustain corruption in the tax col-
lection because the eﬃcient high proﬁtable ﬁrms are less likely to engage in
concealment and corruption. As is well known, under certain conditions
these types can be separated even when there is informational asymmetry.
This is where wealth inequality comes in to play. Because some households
are wealth constrained, it is not possible to separate the diﬀerent types com-
pletely. That means some good types get pooled with the bad types. This
raises the cost of capital for these good types and lowers the cost of capital
for the bad types. The bad types, in turn, engage in corruption and earn
higher than their true proﬁt. Both these factors contribute to a rise in the
13This is somewhat similar to the distortionary eﬀect of corruption on occupational choice or technology
choice in Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
11number of the bad types and fall in the number of the good ﬁrms.
So how can corruption and competition coexist in our model? From
the previous discussion it is clear that wealth inequality and informational
problems facilitates the entry of the bad types in the market while it may
reduce the number of good types. Therefore in the presence of inequality
and informational asymmetries we can have a situation where the increase
in bad ﬁrms is greater than the exit of the good ﬁrms thereby increasing
the total ﬁrms in the market. The bad ﬁrms are prone to corruption, which
also acts as another facilitating factor for their entry. We will then have a
case where the total number of ﬁrms have increased and at the same time
corruption will have increased too.
We have three diﬀerent agents who act in a strategic fashion: (a) house-
holds, (b) banks and (c) inspectors. We describe the characteristics of each
agent below.
3.2 Inspectors
Inspectors are in charge of collecting taxes. However, they are corruptible
and can collude with the ﬁrm in exchange for a bribe, d. We assume that
there is, however, an anti-corruption system in place. The anti-corruption
inspectors, presumed to be honest14, monitor the ﬁrms and the tax inspectors.
If the ﬁrm evades tax payment by bribing the tax inspector, the bribery is
likely to be discovered with some probability q and both the evading ﬁrm and
the corrupt inspector are penalized.
14We do not go into issues concerning the corruptibility of these super inspectors, see Basu et.al.(1992).
123.3 The Banks
The banks (B) borrow funds from the public at a ﬁxed interest factor r0, and
extend loans of ﬁxed amount K to the ﬁrms. Project returns are stochastic.
Let (1 ¡ ¹i) be the probability of success in a project undertaken by type-
i household. Let ri be the interest factor paid and wi be the amount of
collateral pledged. Various types of assets, which constitute household’s
wealth, can serve as collateral. We assume that the bank incurs a cost
associated with having a collateral. If the bank can observe the types of
borrowers then for each type the bank chooses fri;wig such that the bank
maximizes
¼i
B = (1 ¡ ¹i):ri:K + ¹i:±:wi ¸ ¼0; (1)
where ± < 1 shows the cost the banks face in keeping a collateral and i
represents the type of borrowers and ¼0 = K:r0. In case the bank cannot
observe the diﬀerent types of borrowers but instead knows the distribution




B ¸ ¼0: (2)
We assume there is perfect competition in the banking sector, so that
the above condition is always satisﬁed with equality. We shall call it the
zero-proﬁt condition.
3.4 The Households
Households, in our model, can either undertake entrepreneurial activity and
join the production sector (ﬁrms) or engage in some outside option. House-
holds diﬀer in terms of the payoﬀ form their outside option.
13As mentioned earlier, when it comes to production, there are two diﬀerent
types of households, (i) households with good projects (g) and (ii) households
with bad projects (b). The good projects have a higher probability of success
and in successful states they lead to higher output/gross proﬁt as well. Let
Yi be the output produced by type-i. We assume for type i, where i = g; b,
the output Yi = 0 with probability ¹i and Yi > 0 with probability (1 ¡ ¹i).
We assume that ¹g < ¹b and Yg > Yb:
Households also diﬀer in terms of their initial wealth. We assume that
some households have no wealth. These wealth constrained households can
have good or bad projects, but to simplify the analysis we assume that these
wealth constrained households have only good projects and denote this group
as p. So we have three groups, the rich household with good project (g), the
poor household with good project (p) and the rich household with the bad
project (b).
Households (ﬁrms) engaged in production have to pay various types of
taxes. Some of these would depend on their output or proﬁt and some
are ﬁxed in nature. These include various license fees, lump sum taxes,
compliance costs of various kinds. In many developing economies, these
would take the form of costs associated with safety laws, labour laws. We
concentrate on these types of costs and treat the total cost of doing business
to be ﬁxed for all types of households. This is captured through a lump-sum
tax T. In some ways this should also discourage the b-types from entering
the market. However, as mentioned earlier, the households can bribe the
inspector and end up paying a smaller amount.
It is clear that household’s expected income from entrepreneurial activity
14will depend on the cost of evading taxes and the cost of borrowing funds from
the bank. Let Vij represent the expected income of the jth-household within
type-i where
Vij = (1 ¡ ¹i):f(Yi ¡ ri:K) ¡ Xi)g ¡ ¹i:wi ¸ V 0
ij (3)
where Xi is the expected cost (which includes bribe or tax payment) and
V 0
ij is the outside option available to the jth-household of type-i. Note when
production takes place Vij = Vi, 8j 2 i.
If Vij ¸ V 0
ij then the jth-household of type-i will undertake production. We
assume that V 0
ij 2 [V ;V ] and all types have the same uniform distribution
over [V ;V ]. So Vi will determine what fraction of the household of type-i
will undertake production and enter the credit market.
3.5 The game
After production has been undertaken, depending on the realization of Yi ,
the ﬁrm makes a report of its income. The failure state can be viewed as a
bankruptcy state and can always be veriﬁed. If the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy,
the bank will verify the state and claim the value of collaterals wi. As is stan-
dard in the literature, we assume that a ﬁrm will never declare bankruptcy
with positive output15. In the successful state, the ﬁrm makes the due re-
payment ri:K to the bank. It is in this state the ﬁrm is supposed to pay a
tax.
Before we begin the analysis it will be useful to summarize the sequence
of moves in the model.
1. Nature chooses the diﬀerent types of the household. The households
15Here, we are simply following the standard interpretation of debt contracts under costly state veriﬁcation.
15decide whether to undertake entrepreneurial activity or not. This decision
is denoted by a 2 f0;1g, where a = 1 refers to production activity.
2. The bank oﬀers a contract or a menu of contracts to the house-
holds/ﬁrms (ri;wi).
3. The ﬁrm chooses a particular contract.
4. Once the output is realized the inspector and the ﬁrm decide whether
to collude and the amount of bribe d to be paid. When d = 0, there is no
corruption.
5. Following the inspector’s report, taxes are paid and all bribe or incentive
payments are also made.
For convenience, we shall label stages 2-3 as the credit market game and
stages 4-5 as the bribe (tax and corruption) game. Clearly, the outcome in
the bribe game will determine the outcome in the credit market. We shall
be looking at equilibria satisfying backward induction and hence we shall
always work with the bribe game ﬁrst. Note that a precise deﬁnition of an
equilibrium would require us to specify actions at each stage 2-5. This will
necessitate introduction of more notation. Hence we shall simply focus on
the household’s decision to enter production, the credit market outcome and
the bribe amount.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium is deﬁned as a tuple faij; (ri;wi); dig such that
given households’ decision, the credit market is in equilibrium and given the
credit contracts (ri;wi) and the bribe di, each household’s decision is optimal.
In addition, household’s and the inspector’s decison to collude or not (di =
0;di > 0) is also optimal.
An equilibrium in the game stages 2-5 will induce a unique outcome on
16household’s entry decisions. Household’s choice of a depends on the expected
payoﬀ Vij from production and the outside option V 0
ij: Note that within each
type, households diﬀer only in terms of their outside option V 0
ij. Therefore
when it comes to the decision to enter or not,. households within each type
may behave diﬀerently, whereas when it comes to the credit market and the
bribe amount they will behave identically. To distinguish this fact, in the
equilbrium, we have an extra subscript j for the entry variable a.
We shall ﬁnd it convenient to describe household’s choice to enter, by the
participation rate of each type of household – denoted by ¸i. It represents
the fraction of households of type-i entering production sector. Let ni be the
number of i-type households, then given ¸i, we can calculate the distribution
of diﬀerent types in the credit market as µi = (ni¸i)=
P
ni¸i where i = g;
b. The bribe di, as we shall show in the next section, will be completely
pre-determined for each type of household through Nash Bargaining. Hence,
the reduced form of the equilibrium will be the tuple, f¸i; (ri;wi)g.
4 Results and analysis
4.1 Tax and Bribe
After output is realized, if the ﬁrm decides not to pay the required amount
of tax T, it can approach the regulator for a bribe negotiation. If a bribe
agreement is reached, the ﬁrm pays d to the inspector. However, with some
probability q this bribe/ illegal transaction can be discovered. Then both
the ﬁrm and the inspector are penalized. The inspector faces a ﬁne f, which
may be loosing the job or a promotion. The ﬁrm faces ﬁne h, which may
include a loss of production and loss of reputation in the market in addition
17to the penalty. We assume that hi = ¯:Zi, where ¯ > 0 and Zi is net proﬁt
(Yi ¡ ri:K).
It is clear that bribing occurs iﬀ












where ® = q:¯.
Remark 2 There is a critical net income, Z, such that all ﬁrms with net
proﬁt, Zi · Z, will engage in corruption.
The intuitive interpretation of this result is that the beneﬁt of corruption
does not increase with income but the cost does. The high proﬁt eﬃcient
ﬁrms stand to loose more from the illegal transaction. Alternatively, this
could be interpreted as a situation where a ﬁrm looses its license or ceases
to operate once its illegal behavior is detected. In that case only ﬁrms who
do not have a long future in the market are likely to take the risk of being
illegal. This argument has been used in the literature in the context of
eﬃciency wage of the tax inspectors. An inspector is not likely to engage in
bribery if the wages are high, because the inspector would not like to loose
this high future stream of wage income for the present bribe. In our case it is
the prospect of future proﬁtability (not explicitly modelled) which determines
a ﬁrm’s willingness to engage in risky bribe transactions.
We can model the bribing process using the Nash Bargaining approach or
a simple counter-oﬀer model. Let each party make a take it-or-leave it oﬀer
18with equal probability. In that case, with probability 1=2 the ﬁrm will oﬀer
q:f. This is the minimum amount the inspector will accept. On the other
hand, with probability 1=2 the inspector will demand (T ¡ ®:Z), as this is
the maximum the ﬁrm would be willing to pay. Hence the expected bribe




[T + q:f ¡ ®:Z]: (6)




[T + qf ¡ ®Z] + ®Z: (7)
This yields inequality (5) given earlier.
Remark 3 Notice that as q falls (or T rises), Z rises and more ﬁrms would
be encouraged to engage in corruption.
4.2 Credit market
In this section we discuss the credit market game. First we consider a
benchmark case where there is no imperfection in the credit market. We
will show that when the banks can identify the diﬀerent types (good or bad)
of households, the wealth inequality among the households does not matter.
Wealth here is mainly in terms of collaterizable assets. Wealth inequality
leads to a situation where some households can put up collateral and others
cannot. The level of wealth does not aﬀect a household’s need to borrow K
or income streams Yi
16.
16A natural interpretation of this wealth would be various assets which can not be used in the production
but households could borrow money against these. It is unlikely that one with more land would need less
capital and borrow less.
194.2.1 Complete information benchmark
Note that under complete information, there is no need for collateral. This
is a direct implication of the collateral cost. This can be seen in the ﬁgure
The ﬁgure shows the iso-proﬁt curves and indiﬀerence curves ( Vi) of the
diﬀerent types of households in the r £ w plane. Given that ¹b > ¹g, the
b-type high risk households have a steeper indiﬀerence curve. The dotted
lines show the zero proﬁt lines for the bank. Notice that there is a cost
associated with the collateral. This means that the banks will prefer not to
have collateral to cover their loans completely. It can be checked that the




















Since 1 > ± > 0; the household’s indiﬀerence curve is steeper than the
banks indiﬀerence curve. Under complete information, points D and E, in
Figure 1, are the equilibrium contracts. Firms with a good projects will be
oﬀered contract E and ﬁrms with a bad projects will be oﬀered D. The
g-type ﬁrms will pay a lower interest rate where as the high risk b-type ﬁrms
will pay a higher interest rate. Note that this situation will not change if
there is wealth inequality. Since there is no collateral use in equilibrium, the
20wealth constrained p-type ﬁrms (who diﬀers from the g-types only in term of
their wealth) would be charged the same low interest rate as the g-types.
Let rg and rb denote the corresponding interest factors17. Let superscript
c denote the outcome under complete information. Then the net income Zi




p. So according to our previous discussion, the b-types are
likely candidates for engaging in corruption. We assume that
Zc
b < Z < Zc
g = Zc
p (9)
However, this does not guarantee that corruption will take place in equi-
librium. That depends on whether the b-types will enter production in the
ﬁrst place. Let V c
ij be the expected income of the jth-ﬁrm of type-i under
complete information. As mentioned earlier, when production takes place
V c
ij = V c
i , 8j 2 i. The following condition shows that under complete in-
formation, if the b-types pay the full tax, T, none of them decides to enter
production, whereas the all of the g-types enter even if they pay the full tax.
V c
b = (1 ¡ ¹b)(Zc
b ¡ T) < V 0
bj; 8j 2 b: (10)
V c
g = (1 ¡ ¹g)(Zc
g ¡ T) > V 0
gj; 8j 2 g: (11)






[T + qf ¡ ®Zc
b] + ®Zc
b;
which includes the bribe it pays and the expected ﬁne if caught.
Given that Xc
b < T, some of the b-types may now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter
production. We represent the condition as
17Since rg = rp and Yg = Yp; we are suppressing the notation for the poor in this subsection.
219 j such that V c
b = (1 ¡ ¹b)(Zc
b ¡ T) > V 0
bj: (12)
This is where corruption plays a vital role by allowing for few b-types to
enter. Therefore, under complete information, we have all the g-types and
some b-types in production and there is corruption in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In the complete information case, if (9) (11) and (12) hold,
some bad projects are undertaken along with good projects and there is cor-
ruption. We have ¸c
g = 1 and ¸c
b > 0.
4.2.2 Incomplete Information
Next, we study the case where the banks do not have information about the
types of the households. However, the distribution of the diﬀerent types
of households is common knowledge. We analyze two situations under such
incomplete information. First case is where the households do not suﬀer from
any wealth constraints. The other case is where some of the households are
wealth constrained and hence cannot put up any collateral.
4.2.3 Incomplete information with no wealth constraints
Now, since the banker cannot a priori distinguish between the diﬀerent types,
the banker uses the two instruments, r and w, at his disposal to screen the
diﬀerent types18. It is clear that the complete information pair D and E
would not be incentive compatible because the b-type could always get a
higher payoﬀ by choosing E. As seen in Figure 1, we can ﬁnd a pair D,
F such that the incentive compatibility condition and the bank’s zero proﬁt
18See Bester (1985) for an early model of screening with collateral.
22condition are satisﬁed. This mechanism allows for self selection of the types.
The g-type chooses a contract where he pays a lower interest rate and a higher
collateral. The b-type prefers to pay no collateral and the same interest rate
as earlier. We represent the conditions under which screening will take
place in the proposition below. The superscript I represents the incomplete
information with no wealth constraints.
Proposition 5 There exists a separating equilibrium in the credit market










b. The number of corrupt ﬁrms stays the same, though
the level of corruption (as a relative measure) may be higher.
Proof: The analysis is standard in the absence of the tax-corruption game.
However, as discussed earlier, the tax-bribery game changes the incentive
compatible constraints. We need to verify that the screening contract in fact
does satisfy these constraints. The low risk type chooses a contract where he
pays a lower interest rate and a higher collateral. The high risk type prefers
to pay no collateral and the same interest rate as earlier.
Let XI
b be the expected cost incurred when the b-types acts as the g-type
and X
I
b is the cost incurred when it acts honestly. The b-type’s incentive
compatible condition is given by
(1 ¡ ¹b)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ X
I






g, using (6) one can show that X
I
b > XI
















23Clearly the g-types are having to put a higher collateral now to avoid
pooling with the b-type. So we have to also make sure that the g-types are
not better oﬀ in a pooling equilibrium. A pooling equilibrium with zero
proﬁt for the bank would mean a pooled interest rate given by
rI =
1





For the screening outcome, described above, to be an equilibrium we need
(1 ¡ ¹g)(Yg ¡ rI
g:K ¡ T) ¡ ¹g:wI
g ¸ (1 ¡ ¹g)
£




Whether this will be satisﬁed or not depends on ¹g, ¹b, µg, µb. In general
(16) will be satisﬁed19 for high values of XI
g,and rI.
It is evident from the ﬁgure that V I
g < V c
g . This can lead to exit of some
g-type ﬁrms from the economy. Therefore the proportion of g-type ﬁrms
in the market under the incomplete information can decrease compared to
the complete information case. Hence, ¸I
g · ¸c
g . On the other hand since
V I
b = V c
b , we have ¸c
b = ¸c
b: Consequently, the number of corrupt ﬁrms will
stay the same. Even if the number of b-type ﬁrms stays the same, their
relative proportion might be higher, µI
g · µc
g. This would imply that the level
of corruption as measured by the ratio of corrupt ﬁrms to the total number
of ﬁrms could be higher. QED.
19Consider a case with K = 20;¼0 = 20;Yg = 200;Yb = 150;




g = 41=25; wI
g = 59=3: It can be checked that all the conditions are satisﬁed. Moreover, the g- types
have a slighly lower payoﬀ than the complete information case. In this equilibrium the g- type’s payoﬀ is
V I
g = 68:76. In the complete information case with rc
g = 2; wc
g = 0, we have V c
g = 75: It can be checked that
for the b-type V c
b = V I
b = 16:87:
244.2.4 Incomplete information and wealth inequality
In the presence of wealth inequality, eﬀectively there are three types of ﬁrms,
(i) b-types, (ii) g-types, and (iii) p-types (which are basically the collateral
constrained g-type ﬁrms).
Recall that contracts E and F are oﬀered under incomplete information
without wealth constraints. Due to the presence of p-type ﬁrms the stan-
dard screening outcome of the credit market, where the diﬀerent types are
completely separated, is not feasible20. This is because in any separating out-
come, the g-type will have to put up some collateral, but since the p-types
are collateral constrained, the bank is forced to oﬀer them a contract with
no collateral. In that case, it is easy for the high risk b-types to act as the
p-types
is possible, where the g-types are separated out and the b and p-types pool.
The g-types are oﬀered contract B and the p and b-types pool at A. Note
that the b-types have no incentive to deviate from A to B: The p-types cannot
deviate to any contract with w > 0. Moreover, the g-types also have no
incentive to deviate to A: Using superscript s to denote the outcome under
semi-separating equilibrium under incomplete information, let V s
i represent
the expected income of type-i: Then compared to the complete information
case; V s
p < V c
p , V s
b > V c
b and V s
g < V c
g . However, note that V c
p ¡V s
p > V c
g ¡V s
g .
In other words, the loss in income is much higher for the p-types compared
to the g-types.
We can rule out a complete pooling outcome if the pooled interest rate
20Screening can be achieved using loan size also but in the present case it is ﬁxed.




[(µg + µp):(1 ¡ ¹g) + µb:(1 ¡ ¹b)]:K
: (17)
The probability that a borrower belongs to type-i household undertaking
entrepreneurial activity, when the credit market outcome is a pooled one,
is given by µi. Likewise, under the semi-separating equilibrium the pooled
interest (partial pooling of b and p-types) is given by
r¤ =
¼0
(Áp:(1 ¡ ¹g) + Áb:(1 ¡ ¹b)):K
; (18)
where Ái represents the proportion of type-i engaged in production and
accepting the pooled contract under the semi-separating equilibrium; Ái =
µi=(µb +µp); i = b; p. Comparing (17) and (18), it is easy to see that r¤ > r:
This implies that more b-types would enter the market under a completely
pooled contract and it will not be proﬁtable to oﬀer such a contract in equi-
librium.
As we have observed in the previous section, the b-types are more likely
to be corrupt because Zc
b < Z. Now in the semi-separating case, Zs
b > Zc
b,
because they end up paying a lower interest rate. However, if Zs
b < Z, the
b-types will evade taxes and pay a bribe. We continue to assume that
Zs
b < Z < Zs
p < Zc
g: (19)
The expected income of the b-types here would be given by
V s










b > V c
b : Now it is more likely that for some b-types V s
bj > V 0
bj.
Hence more b-types are likely to enter. On the other hand some of the p-
types may exit the market since V s
p < V c
p : There might also be a drop in the
g-types but not of the same order. All this will depend on the distribution
of the outside payoﬀ. Suppose the following condition holds,
V > V s
b > V ; V s
g > V ; V s
p > V : (21)
This implies that despite the reduction in Vg, all the g-types continue
to enter the production and ¸s
g = 1: The same need not be true for the
poor households with good projects. On the other hand, compared to the
incomplete information without wealth inequality case, more b-types also
enter production sector. Therefore, ¸s
b > ¸I
b. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 Under incomplete information and wealth inequality, there
exists a semi-separating screening equilibrium [fr¤
g;w¤
gg;fr¤;0g] where the b
and p types pool at r¤and g type separates at fr¤
g;w¤
gg. We have ¸s
g = 1;
¸s




Note that if condition (19) is not satisﬁed and we have Zs
p < Z; then the
poor households with good projects will also ﬁnd it worthwhile to engage in
corruption. In this sense, corruption can spread because of the presence of
the b-types in the market.
Proposition 7 Corruption will be higher than the incomplete information
with no wealth constraint case as a large proportion of the b-types will enter
the production sector and engage in bribery.
274.2.5 Changes in Inequality
Suppose there is a rise in inequality of wealth such that the number of wealth
constrained poor households is higher. We can consider a redistribution of
wealth such that nb stays the same, ng falls and np rises. Let us assume that,
prior to redistribution, ¸s
g = 1; ¸s
p = 1 and ¸s
b > 0: This means that as np rises,
the pooled interest rate will fall. At the pre-redistribution participation rates,
rise in np will lead to a rise in µp and fall in µb. Since (1¡¹g) > (1¡¹b), it is
clear that (using (18)) r¤ will fall. Consequently, fr¤
g;w¤
gg will also change and
V s
g will rise, but it will make no change to their participation rates. On the
other hand, V s
b will increase and that would lead to more b-type households
in the market. The rise in ¸b will in fact be the equilibrating force as this
would lead to a rise in µb and arrest the fall in the pooled interest rate. But
it is clear that in the new equilibrium, following the redistribution of wealth,
¸b is higher. Since the participation rates of the poor and the rich households
with good projects do not change and the redistribution is conﬁned only to
them, a rise in the participation of the b-type households would lead to an
increase in the number of ﬁrms in the production sector and a rise in the
number of corrupt ﬁrms. We can state the following corrollary.
Corollary 8 As the fraction of poor households increases following a rise
in wealth inequality, more b-type households enter the production sector and
there is a rise in corruption.
This matches well with our earlier observation in section 2 that a rise in
inequality is associated with greater incidence of corruption21. In terms of
21As mentioned earlier, a recent empirical exercise using cross-country regressions also ﬁnd that income
inequality increases corruption. See You and Khagram (2003).
28the number of ﬁrms, the total number of ﬁrms can go up or down depending
on the distribution of the outside option and the value of ¸p before the redis-
tribution. For example, if ¸p < 1; then following the redistribution, ¸p goes
up but the total number of ﬁrms in the market might go down. Irrespective
of what happens to the total number, the number of b-type ﬁrms will always
go up.
5 Discussion
5.1 Competition and Corruption
The b-type households beneﬁt in two ways-their cost of funds is subsidized
by the other households to some extent and they also manage to increase
proﬁtability by avoiding tax payments. Either of these factors alone may not
be suﬃcient to encourage increased participation by the b-type households.
In the text we showed that in the absence of imperfections in the credit
market, there are very few b-type households engaged in production. One
could make a similar claim concerning corruption also. In the absence of
corruption, the b ¡ types will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter the market even
if they pay an interest rate lower than rb. To consider an extreme case,
suppose the government pursues a policy (q; ¯; T) such that corruption can
be completely deterred and (1 ¡ ¹b)[Yb ¡ rgK ¡ T] · V 0
bj: In such a case,
no b-type will choose to enter even when it can borrow funds at the most
subsidized rate. In the credit market, both the g-type and p-type will be
treated in identical fashion and will be oﬀered rg. Neither wealth inequality
nor informational asymmetry will matter.
Depending on the distribution of the outside options (income from non
29entrepreneurial activity), increased participation by the b-types could lead
to a overall rise in the number of households in the production sector. The
rise in the b-type’s participation can compensate for the drop in the house-
holds with good projects (mainly the p-types) participation. In this sense, a
higher number households in production can coexist with greater corruption.
This has been noted earlier in Laﬀont and N’Guessan (1999) in a diﬀerent
context. They point out that increased corruption can coexist with greater
competition in an agency setting because it might be optimal to tolerate
more corruption in equilibrium. Moreover, greater competition always raises
welfare despite increase in corruption. We are making a separate point here.
There is increased corruption in equilibrium because more households would
choose to engage in it. Secondly, as more b-types participate, welfare might
go down. This is because the presence of these types exert negative external-
ities and the b-types are more ineﬃcient. Without adding more structure to
the model, it is not possible characterize welfare in a precise way.
The entry of the b-type households has implications for the anti-corruption
policy . Note that one crucial determinant of the anti-corruption policy is
the probability of detection q. It is possible that q will fall as the number
of households in the production sector increases. The same number of in-
spectors will have to monitor a larger population now. This would lead to
a rise in Z implying that more households would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to engage
in bribery. Similarly, a rise in T would also imply a rise in Z. However,there
is a discontinuity in the rise of corruption here. As T rises suﬃciently, the
b-type households might not enter the production sector even though they
would have engaged in bribery had they entered. So we might see elimination
30of corruption for suﬃciently high T. The rise in T can also be interpreted
in various ways. It could mean that there are stricter quality controls and
standards and non-subsidized inputs. In that case, a rise in T can be an wel-
come policy. But the feasibility and success of the policy would also depend
on how proﬁtable the g- type households are. A high T should not end up
discouraging them too. On the other hand if T is due to high taxes, controls
and red tapes, it would be ideal to reduce T.
5.2 Wealth Inequality, Corruption and Poverty
So far we have assumed that the diﬀerent types of ﬁrms were pre-determined.
This basically worked at two levels, with each household’s endowment of
(good or bad) projects and their level of wealth being exogenously given.
In this section we relax the pre-determination of the kind of project each
household can acquire. So given a distribution of wealth, we ask, how will
ﬁrms make their choices of projects? In the presence of corruption will these
imply a high or a low inequality? Our model has no immediate answer but
extensions to the model can throw some light. Indeed what we intend to
show here is that in equilibrium poor households may end up choosing bad
projects and rich households may end up in good projects. This means that
the initial inequality may lead to some kind of a trap situation for the poor
households.
Suppose, nature does not decide the distribution of b and g types. House-
holds (either poor or rich) have to make some investment (eﬀort) e prior
to the realization of their project type. This investment could be broadly
interpreted as activities like searching for ideas, gathering of information,
31exploring networks and markets. Let the cost of this be given by C(e) and
C0 > 0, C00 ¸ 0. The probability ½ that the project would be g-type will
depend on e; 0 · ½(e) · 1, ½0 ¸ 0 and ½00 · 0. Like before, let Vb; Vg denote
the net payoﬀs associated with a bad and a good project respectively. Vp
refers to the payoﬀ associated with a good project by the poor household.
Households choose e to maximize
[½(e)Vg + (1 ¡ ½(e))Vb] ¡ C(e). (22)
For our purpose let us assume that C(0) = 0, C00 = 0 and
½(e) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 when e < e1
(0;1) when e1 · e < e2
1 when e ¸ e2
.
will lead to two possible choices.
One outcome is at e = 0 and the other outcome is at e = e2 > 0. Therefore
if households decide to not to put any eﬀort then they end up with a bad
project and a lower V . On the other hand if they decide to put a lot of eﬀort,
they get a good project and therefore a higher V . We can easily augment
our earlier notion of equilibrium by adding the choice of e at the beginning.
The following proposition suggests that poor could indeed remain poor by
choosing low eﬀort in equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Given market imperfections and corruption possibilities, there
exists an equilibrium where the poor households will choose e = 0 , the rich
32households will choose e = e2 and in the credit market banks would oﬀer a




Proof: The credit market outcome is the same as the outcome in Propo-
sition 5 since there are just good and bad types and good types are not
collateral constrained. Hence, a poor household deviating from its choice of
e = 0, will not be able to opt for the contract meant for the good types.
Note that we only need to consider the extreme values of eﬀort (e = 0 and
e = e2) for showing the optimality of the households’ decisions. If a poor
household chooses low eﬀort e = 0; then its expected payoﬀ would be given
by V s
b = (1 ¡ ¹b)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ Xb). Recall that the bad types can engage in
corruption and ﬁnd it proﬁtable to be in the market. On the other hand,
if it chooses high eﬀort, it still does pay the same interest rate and does not
engage in corruption. Hence its expected payoﬀ from choosing high eﬀort
e = e2 will be given by V I
g = (1 ¡ ¹g)(Yg ¡ rI
b:K ¡ T). Therefore, choosing
e = 0 is optimal if the following condition is satisﬁed
C(e2) > (¹b ¡ ¹g)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ XI
b) + (1 ¡ ¹g)(∆ ¡ m): (23)
where ∆ = Yg ¡ Yb and m = T ¡ XI
b.
On the other hand a rich household will choose a higher eﬀort if V I
g ¡
C(e2) > V I
b . For a rich household, when it chooses a good project, it can
easily separate itself out by paying the collateral. Hence its expected payoﬀ
is given by V I
g = [(1 ¡ ¹g)(Yg ¡ rI
g:K ¡ T) ¡ ¹g:wI
g]. On the other hand
if it puts low eﬀort and goes for a bad project, its expected payoﬀ will be
V I
b = (1 ¡ ¹b)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ Xb). Therefore, for the rich type to choose a high
eﬀort it must be the case that
(¹b ¡ ¹g)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ XI
b) + (1 ¡ ¹g)(∆ + ¾:k ¡ m) ¡ ¹g:wI
g > C(e2): (24)
33where ¾ = rI
b ¡ rI
g. Both these conditions will be satisﬁed if
L < C(e2) < L + ¿
where L = (¹b ¡ ¹g)(Yb ¡ rI
bK ¡ XI
b) + (1 ¡ ¹g)(∆ ¡ m) and ¿ = (1 ¡
¹g)¾:k ¡ ¹g:wI
g. For very low values of ¹g this condition will be satisﬁed.
Hence we will get a situation where the poor are choosing low eﬀort and
hence bad projects where as the rich are choosing high eﬀort and hence good
projects. Q.E.D.
Remark 10 It is possible that many other equilibria also exist. It is impor-
tant to realize that in the absence of corruption such polarization will not
occur in equilibrium. Since the bad types will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter
the market, only the good types will stay in the market and there will be no
need for use of collaterals. This would mean the poor household can easily
choose high eﬀort and enter. The equilibrium in the previous proposition will
not hold.
We chose a special functional form for ½(e) to show the polarized nature of
the equilibrium, but the arguments can be shown to carry over to a general
case. Presence of wealth constraints creates disincentives for the poor to
choose high eﬀort as the poor types are prevented from fully beneﬁtting from
their high eﬀort. Therefore under incomplete information, even when the
poor have put e2 amount of eﬀort, they cannot be distinguished in the credit
market since they cannot put up the collateral that rich good types can.
Also in such situation the pay-oﬀs of being the bad type increases due to
corruption. Hence, with market imperfections and corruption, Vp < Vg and
Vb is higher. Therefore there is a strong incentive for the poor to choose
34low eﬀort levels. The poor will always invest less than the rich households
and will have bad projects more often. This could mean that inequality will
be sustained. However, it is important to note that in the absence of any
imperfections, Vp = Vg and (Vg ¡ Vb) is also maximized. This will lead to
both poor and rich households choosing same optimal levels of e.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that when market imperfections exist, greater competition
can coexist with greater corruption. The scope of corruption allows ineﬃcient
ﬁrms to survive in the market. As more and more ineﬃcient ﬁrms enter the
market, the total number of ﬁrms might rise but corruption also rises. It
is not our intention to say which causes what, whether greater competition
reduces corruption or corruption reduces competition. Both these can coexist
because of several other factors- in our case wealth inequality and incomplete
information in the credit market.
The multi-market orientation of our model can lead to a somewhat diﬀer-
ent focus so far as policy implications are concerned. It shows that policy
intervention crucially depends on the nature of outcomes in the other mar-
ket. Policy intervention in the credit market, for example, will depend on the
extent of corruption. In some cases, corruption makes it diﬃcult to imple-
ment other policies aimed at addressing the credit market problems arising
out of inequality. Likewise, anti corruption policies have to be evaluated in
the light of the credit market outcomes. In general, anti corruption policy
analysis takes a partial equilibrium approach and focuses on the same market
where corruption takes place (in this case tax collection). In the present case
35that would mean looking at tax reforms and system of incentives for the tax
inspectors. Our paper, complementary to this approach, would point also in
the direction of the credit market. This, we consider, is an important point
to bear in mind while designing policies especially in developing countries
where more than one market exhibit various kinds of imperfections. This
view in a wider context is not new22, but is worth emphasizing in the context
of corruption.
Even though we do not model competition in the product market, our
paper is similar to the studies looking at the relation between competition
and corruption. Here also the number of ﬁrms in the production sector is
being determined endogenously. As has been rightly pointed by Bliss and di
Tella (1997), one would need to go beyond the simple measure of the number
of ﬁrms to capture competition. But we don’t have any alternative measure.
Competition, in the sense of simply the number of ﬁrms, may not be a good
outcome in our model context. If too many ineﬃcient types enter the market
at the cost of the eﬃcient types then the total number of the ﬁrms might go
up but the total expected output might be less. So the eﬀect of corruption
on competition is not quite straightforward. Corruption can lead to a rise
in the total number of ﬁrms23.
We have not modelled competition in an explicit way. Preliminary results
show that this can be done to some extent. The interaction between the
eﬃcient (g-type) and ineﬃcient (b-type) ﬁrms in the product market can be
analyzed. This will allow us to make more deﬁnite welfare comparisons.
22To consider a recent example from the debate on child labour, many authors (see Basu 2000) would
argue that the prescription does not necessarily lies in reforming labour laws or trade laws.
23Over-crowding due to market imperfections has been noted, see for example deMeza and Webb (1992).
36Similarly, the relationship between wealth inequality can be explored fur-
ther. As our analysis in the previous section suggests, we can analyze the
extent to which corruption contributes to the persistence of inequality. The
static framework in the paper can be extended to a fully dynamic model.
Wealth inequality and corruption are related in another important way.
It is possible that wealthier households would spend more resources into
buying power and access to politicians and bureaucrats. One can model a
situation where the household, in addition to choosing whether to produce
or not, also chooses how much to invest (monetary as well as non monetary
resources such as eﬀort) in buying access. This would be similar to the case
where ﬁrms spend money on campaign contributions, buy contacts and spend
eﬀort in building political and bureaucratic network. A ﬁrm with access can
evade taxes with a higher probability. This ex-ante choice of investment in
access buying can replace the current framework where they bribe later. This
way we can derive household’s investment in access buying as a function of
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